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In  this  article  we  present  the  risks  faced  by  the  new  countries  that  have  joined  the 
European Union, and which also desire to adopt the euro currency as quickly as possible. 
We will analyze the existing literature regarding the ways these risks manifest themselves, 
depending on the economic conditions present in these countries. The risks are mostly 
caused by an incomplete fulfillment of the optimum currency area conditions, especially 
the ones regarding the synchronization of the business cycles, the existence of mitigation 
mechanisms in the case of asymmetric shocks, and to a lesser extent, the insufficient 
flexibility  of  the  European  labor  markets.  In  addition,  because  there  are  different 
economic conditions between the countries that plan on introducing the euro currency 
and the ones that already had, mostly related to a lower economic development and lower 
prices, there are specific risks that affect the former countries. Moreover, the benefits of 
entering  the  EMU  –  greater  monetary  stability,  reduced  transaction  costs,  lower 
exchange rate volatility and a decrease of the interest rates – can in some specific cases 
become also costs. In order to quantify all these elements, we have constructed a case 
study of Portugal, which has entered the EMU in the first wave. We have determined that 
Portugal’s experience after the euro introduction was a negative one, when compared 
with the previous period, because the convergence process did not actually happened, as 
expected. Not only that, but the economic differences between Portugal and the other 
EMU countries deepened, and the country’s fiscal situation also deteriorated badly in all 
these years, up to the point where Portugal was forced to ask for external help. The case 
of  Portugal is  very  important for  the  countries  that  are  eager to  adopt the  common 
currency without first achieving a sustainable economic development, through increasing 
labor productivity and exports. It shows that fulfilling the nominal criteria and entering 
EMU must not be a declared goal, but just the last measure implemented after reducing 
the economic disparities and reaching a balanced economic development. Based on the 
existing realities from the Central and Eastern European states, different scenarios can 
be  constructed  that  will  take  into  account  the  way  these  risks  influence  the  future 
economic  environment,  should  these  states  were  to  decide  accelerating  the  common 
currency adoption process.               
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1. Introduction 
There are undeniable benefits of adopting the common currency, and the most important 
of these are a greater monetary stability, reduced transaction costs, decreased exchange 
rate volatility and lower interest rates. Still, it must be mentioned that these benefits are 
effective  only  if  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  functions  as  it  was intended  to, 
without major economic turmoil – a detail that a few years ago was not even mentioned, 
but which recently has surfaced. Moreover, these benefits are not unidirectional, but have 
a hidden sight, in some specific cases being able to become substantial costs. 
Adopting the euro by a newly European Union member state would generate a climate of 
monetary  stability.    The  experience  demonstrated  that  the  less  developed  European 
countries are exposed to a higher risk posed by massive external capital flows, or even 
speculative  attacks  against  their  own  currency,  perceived  as  being  more  vulnerable. 
Because the market expects that the economic development will accelerate following the 
start  of  the  euro  currency  adoption  process,  or  because  of  the  existing  investment 
opportunities in these countries, investment capital searching bigger returns will enter, 
quickly affecting the exchange rate. The massive capital inflows can also unexpectedly 
exit, if the economic growth is not on target, if the fiscal situation is not stable or if it 
finds better investment/speculative opportunities in other countries (Janackova and Borek 
2004). Being part of a much more solid monetary structure build around the common 
currency would eliminate an important part of the monetary instability risk. Still, we must 
mention  that  this  benefit  is  valid  only  when  the  euro  currency  is  not  affected 
internationally by global events that could erode its own stability. 
Reducing the transaction costs is another benefit of adopting the euro currency. This 
benefit is especially visible in the trading sector among the Economic and Monetary 
Union member states, which use the same currency in their transactions. These countries 
experienced a fast increase of their trade after the launch of the EMU (Barr 2003). This 
advantage takes place just in the case of open economies, which are capable of exporting 
on the European market competitive products, in great quantities.  
A third important benefit of adopting the common currency would be the decrease of the 
exchange rate. This would in turn eliminate the inherent higher exchange rate fluctuations 
experienced in relation with the country’s external partners. Lowering the exchange rate 
volatility implies the reduction of costs incurred for protecting against these undesirable 
events. Moreover, if the volatility of the exchange rate diminishes, the risks experienced 
by the foreign investment projects are also lower, which in turn stimulate a more active 
investment  environment,  with  immediate  effects  on  the  economic  growth  and  the 
convergence  process.  Unfortunately  giving  up  the  ability  to  use  this  monetary 
intervention  instrument  has  also  negative  consequences,  because  when  economic 
imbalances appear, the adjustment costs can be higher by using other methods.  
A last major benefit of adopting the euro currency is the rapid reduction of the interest 
rates,  with  positive  consequences  upon  the  economy.  This  interest  rates  reduction  is 27 
mainly determined by a lower monetary risk, an element that is always incorporated in 
the  interest’s  nominal  rate.  A  quick  lowering  of  the  interest  rates  can  have  negative 
consequences also, when it is accompanied by a relaxation of the credit standards, which 
determined  in  the  new  euro  zone  member  states  an  increase  in  consumption  and  a 
decrease in savings, having as a final result an unsustainable increase in the households’ 
level of debt (Fagan and Gaspar 2007). 
 
2. The risks of a too quick adoption of the euro currency by the new EU member 
states  
A too quick adoption of the euro currency by the new EU member states has major risks, 
especially if the economies of these states are not well developed. There are risks that 
derive from the theory of the optimum currency areas, as well as specific risks caused by 
an insufficient economic development or induced by the economic convergence process. 
Often the costs generated by these risks are very high, being sometimes able to surpass 
the advantages of adopting the common currency.  
One of the basic conditions stipulated by the theory of optimum currency areas for a 
smooth functioning of a monetary union is the synchronization of the business cycles. 
Unfortunately even the countries that already take part in the Economic and Monetary 
Union do not meet this condition. There is a core in the euro zone that acts as a single 
economic  entity,  but  there  are  also  countries  whose  economies  are  far  from  being 
synchronized with this core. For example, the member countries that in the ’70 had high 
levels of GDP/capita – Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – 
also  exhibited  highly  synchronized  business  cycles,  and  entering  the  Economic  and 
Monetary Union did not influence them in any significant way (Giannone, Lenza and 
Reichlin 2009). On the other hand, the states that in the ’70 had relatively lower levels of 
GDP/capita – Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Greece – their business cycles were not 
correlated with the business cycles of the countries form the first category, and moreover, 
even after the introduction of the euro currency, this variability persisted, together with 
the increased volatility of their business cycles. Even more, before their accession in the 
European  Union,  the  business  cycles  of  the  East  European  member  states  were  not 
synchronized with the business cycles of the big euro zone countries, not synchronized 
with  the  business  cycles  of  the  countries  situated  at  the  periphery  of  the  euro  zone 
(Greece, Portugal, Ireland) and not even synchronized among themselves (Süppel 2003). 
It  is  very  important  that  the  harmonization  takes  place  between  the  business  cycles 
belonging to the euro zone countries and those of the acceding EMU countries, otherwise 
the common  monetary policy of the Central European Bank would induce long term 
unbalances in the economies that do not fluctuate in the same manner.   
Another aspect mentioned by the theory of the optimum currency areas is the existence of 
mitigation mechanisms for the asymmetric shocks, which affect just a country or a small 
group of countries. Because the common monetary policy can not solve specific problems 
that appear in a certain state, it is imperative that there exists price and wage flexibility, 
backed by a high labor and capital mobility, in order to successfully respond to these type 
of shocks. In the European Union the labor market rules used to be quite rigid (Silva 
2004), containing many barriers for the quick wage adjustment, and on top of that, for the 
newly  entered  member  states,  there  are  restrictive  regulations  regarding  their  labor 
mobility internationally. Moreover, it has been determined that the countries that joined 28 
the European Union in 2004 are more influenced by asymmetric shocks (Ramos 2004), 
compared with the rest of the countries that are already in the euro zone.  
Besides these general risks that derive from the theory of optimum currency areas, there 
are specific  risks  that result from  a  lower  level  of  economic  development  and  lower 
prices, which exist in the new member states that in the future will also enter the euro 
zone. Entering the Economic and Monetary Union and having their products compete 
with the ones produced in the euro zone would cause a rapid increase in prices, if the 
production technology increases also. If the labor productivity increases at the same speed 
as  the  increase  in  prices,  the  conditions  of  a  durable  convergence  are  met,  without 
experiencing major disturbances along the way. This is the successful way of increasing 
the real convergence that happened in the vast majority of the states that introduced the 
euro  currency:  a  rapid  increase  of  labor  productivity  and  a  remarkable  export 
performance  (Kolasa  2010).  Still, this  process is likely  to  be  a long  one,  which  will 
continue way after the introduction of the common currency in these countries. Therefore, 
reducing the economic disparities will probably determine a higher level of inflation in 
these particular states, which will likely persist for a long time. If this will influence the 
level of the harmonized index of consumer price (HICP) from the euro zone, a too strict 
monetary policy implemented by the European Central Bank would slow this process of 
reducing the economic disparities, with negative consequences upon the states that started 
the economic convergence process. Therefore, a too quick adoption of the euro currency 
can be sub optimal for the less developed states that have entered the European Union 
(Rostowski 2003), because the European Central Bank will never target the acceleration 
of economic convergence among euro countries, but a strict inflationary level of under 
2%.  
 
3. The case of Portugal 
At the beginning of the ’80, Portugal had a precarious economic condition, caused mainly 
by the 1975 revolution, the losing of its colonies and the second oil shock. The budgetary 
deficits  often  surpassed  12%,  and  the  current  account  deficits  10%.  This  was  an 
unsustainable  situation,  and  indeed,  between  1980  and  1987  the  Portuguese  escudo 
depreciated by 60%, wiping the current account deficit (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). 
After  this  stabilization  took  place,  Portugal  embarked  on  an  accelerated  process  of 
economic development, which saw its GDP grow at a yearly average of 5.1% during 
1985-91. During 1992-95 this growth slowed at an average of 1.5% yearly, but then again 
Portugal gained traction during 1996-2001, with an average yearly GDP growth of 3.5%. 
The average yearly inflation dropped from 14% during 1985-91 to 7% during 1992-95, 
stabilizing  to  3.5%  between  1996-2001.  The  labor  market  also  improved,  the 
unemployment decreasing from 7% in 1995-96 to 4% in 2000-2001. 
 
After the start of the euro adoption process and the move towards the fulfillment of the 
Maastricht criteria, Portugal experienced a substantial reduction of its interest rates. This 
was caused by the previous economic performance and by the market perception that the 
euro adoption process will be a successful one. This nominal – as well as real – interest 
rate  reduction,  coupled  with  the  liberalization  of  the  financial  sector  and  increased 
competition, determined an increase in the volume of loans, especially household loans, 
which in the end translated into an increase of internal demand. The process of credit  29 
acceleration peaked just before the euro introduction, when the annual increase in the 
volume of loans was 28.6% in real terms, and the short term (3 months) real interest rate 
was 0% (Brzoza-Brzezina 2005). Coupled with the wage increases, particularly in the 
public  sector,  all  fueled  the  illusory  expectations  that  the  incomes  will  keep  rising 




Figure 1. The increase of household loans and debt 
Source: European Commission 
Before entering the Economic and Monetary Union, Portugal managed to considerably 
reduce the budgetary deficit, from 7.7% of GDP in 1993 to 2.7% of GDP in 1999 (Abreu 
2006).  This  was  not  based  on  a  stricter  fiscal  policy  –  which  in  that  period  was 
expansionistic – but rather on a powerful economic development and low interest rates, 
which  in  turn  determined  lower  costs  for  interest  rate  payments  incurred  by  the 
Portuguese state. Unfortunately the structural reforms implemented towards increasing 
internal production were insufficient. However, with the national debt not surpassing the 
60% limit, Portugal managed to successfully meet all the other nominal convergence 
criteria.   
After entering the Economic and Monetary Union, it was discovered that some sectors, 
especially  the  textile  and  footwear  industries,  which  held  important  shares  in  the 
Portuguese economy, were not prepared for the increased competition environment that 
followed. As a result they lost important market share, the export for these categories of 
merchandises falling from 2/3 of total exports in 1995-96 to 1/3 in 2004-2005 (Abreu 
2006). Thus the Portuguese economy was forced to reorient to the constructions and 
services sectors, which in 2002 were already representing 76.7% of the total value added 
in the whole economy. Consequently the rising internal demand shifted towards foreign 
goods, the value of imports in this segments rising rapidly. In the end the current account 
deficit increased again, surpassing the 10% of GDP in 2000 and remaining at a high level 
ever since. 



















Figure 2. Portugal’s current and capital accounts, 1999-2009 
Source: Portugal National Bank 
In the following years after Portugal entered the Economic and Monetary Union, the 
speed of economic growth decreased. Moreover, due to insufficient structural reforms, 
the country kept losing market share, while the salaries were increasing at a faster rate 
than the ones form the euro zone, mostly because the unemployment was low and there 
was  a  high  pressure  for  constant  wage  growing.  The  process  of  credit  expansion 
continued,  coupled  with  the  rapid  decrease  of  the  saving  rates,  which  resulted  in  an 
increase of the debt burden of the households, which in 2004 reached 118% of disposable 
income, a level surpassed in the euro zone only in the Netherlands (Cardoso 2005). It was 
becoming more and more clear that the high consumption levels could not be sustained 
by the available incomes, especially in an environment of slower productivity gains and 
diminished market share. At the macroeconomic level the situation become dire in time, 
the main fiscal indicators experiencing deterioration, mostly determined by the higher 
sums that had to be allocated to finance the constant current account deficits.  
 
Tabel 1. The evolution of Portugal’s main financial indicators (percent of GDP) 
  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Budgetary deficit   6,1  3,9  2,6  2,8  9,4 
Public debt  63,6  64,7  63,6  66,3  76,8 
Source: Portugal National Bank 
 
4. Conclusions 
Portugal’s experience after entering the Economic and Monetary Union is not a positive 
one. The expected economic convergence never took place, the post adoption low growth 
rates deepening the existing economic disparities with the euro zone, which in 2009 were 
calculated to be 4% bigger than the level experienced before the euro adoption, in 1998. 
% 
GDP 
￿ Goods/services account 
￿ Income account  
￿ Current transfers 
￿ Capital account 
￿ Total result 31 
At the end of 2010 the economy of Portugal was in a dire condition, having a high level 
of public and private debt, a semnificant commercial deficit, and a small GDP growth 
rate, of 1.4%, after a drop of 2.5% in 2009 (Banco de Portugal 2010). These weaknesses 
were observed before the economic crisis, but after the onsets of its effects, they become 
more evident, and the ensuing austerity measures could not reverse this trend. The interest 
rates  of  the  Portuguese  bonds  increased  dramatically,  fueled  by  the  successive 
downgrades operated by the rating agencies. In April 2011 Portugal, after Greece and 
Ireland, asked for external help in order to be able to honor its financial obligations and 


















Figure 3. Economic growth difference, Portugal versus euro zone average, percents 
Source: Portugal National Bank 
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